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PHILOSOPHY AND RELEVANCE WITHIN 
THE AFRICAN CONTEXT 
Godwin Sogolo 
With the world economic recession of the second half 
of this century, planners of education are beginning to reassess 
areas of priority. In both developed and developing nations, 
the common measure of what stands at the apex and what 
stays at the base has become relevance, relevance, in terms 
of comparative utility. There is one important difference 
though: developed nations may, with some comfort, reorder 
their priorities, retaining all there was in their educational 
systems - they can afford a few luxuries alongside their 
chosen essentials. The predicament of most developing 
nations is that of moving beyond the level of survival which 
is basically defined by the absence of luxury. In such a 
situation, priorities•· are reordered among essentials, with 
no room for ,luxuries. 
In this paper, I want to discuss the dilemma of the 
professional .philosopher in modern Africa. I should want 
to argue that by historical accident the African philosopher 
is inevitably caught in a profession he finds difficult to grapple 
with. He may,. with great difficulties, succeed as a philosopher 
but when successful, I wish to argue, the African philosopher 
becomes irrelevant to his society. And since he cannot 
defy the increasing creed of relevance upon which the very 
existence of his profession depends, the African philosopher 
is not sure of what direction to follow. I finally propose 
a reorientation in African philosophy which, in a remarkable 
sense, meets the demands of professional philosophizing 
and yet is of relevance to modern African society. 
One now begins to doubt the impact of the persuasive 
Marxian view that the business of philosophy should be 
directed towards changing the world rather than merely 
explaining it. However, there are still many thinkers who 
agree fully with Marx that philosophy has a role· to play 
in society or, at least, that there is some connection, no 
matter how loose, between philosophy and the problems 
of society. To underscore the relevance of their enterprise 
a few philosophers are prepared to come down from the 
clouds to do more than preoccupy themselves with the mere 
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satisfaction of their intellectual curiosity. These philosophers, 
who believe that their enterprise is not merely that of 
satisfying their profession but also the society in which 
they live, pay dearly for taking this "deviant" route. Thus 
the greatest danger any philosopher of this orientation faces 
is that of not being accorded the status of a "genuine" 
philosopher. And if he insists on belonging to the community 
of philosophers he must, with humility, accept a peripheral 
position, or otherwise quit the scene. 
Reactions to this dilemma are more devastating among 
professional philosophers in developing nations. The 
professional philosopher in Africa, for instance, is aware 
that the only way of staying in his ·profession is by showing 
evidence of its relevance to society. He is also aware that 
the same path leads him out of the ihtellectual community 
to which he so much wishes to belong. Rather than choose 
one way or the other, the first use most African philosophers 
make of their acquired skills is to search for a device that 
enables them to eat their cake and have it. There is a great 
deal of evidence for this. If we relate themes in conference 
proceedings to those of formal classroom philosophical 
teaching, they stand poles apart. In other words, the. 
preoccupation of tnost African philosophers in their various 
institutions of higher learning is different both in content 
and in presentation from that which they bring to the market 
place - conferences, symposia public seminars, etc. Thus 
professional African philosophers present a double-faced 
appearance, one in fulfilment of their professional call and 
the other perhaps adapted to social and material pay-offs. 
There is an immediate temptation to read fraud or 
dishonesty into this charge even before getting its details; 
that, of course, could make it a moral issue which by 
definition, presupposes the possibility of choice and therefore 
the presumption that the African philosopher could have 
done otherwise. Yet, it is not a clear case of conscious 
fraud. It is due to obvious difficulties. See the predicament 
of the African philosopher: he is employed by an institution 
entirely financed by a governmentf a government sponsored 
by a people and a people whose creed of relevance for any 
discipline has increasingly become one of quantifiable utility. 
But philosophy being in Cicero's words "the art of life" whose 
practitioners are men of prudence with acquired skills for 
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manoeuvre, African philosophers are not easy to trap. Only 
the fool would choose not to utilize his acquired skill to 
his own advantage. And the African philosopher is by no 
means one. 
The greatest difficulty that faces the philosopher, apart 
from that of defining the very discipline he practises, is 
the task of showing the relevance of his profession. It is 
a common problem that faces virtually all the literary 
disciplines. This generalization does not itself serve as 
a satisfactory defence. The philosopher is still left to put 
forward his own defence. Efforts have been made severally 
by professional philosophers in Africa at intervals, that 
is, during conferences to demonstrate the relevance of 
philosophy to society. To say such efforts have been 
unsuccessful is to beg one of the points I wish to establish 
in this discussion. The point is that in between conference 
periods, the same philosophers take to a brand of philosophy 
that is almost totally detached from the problems of society. 
Ironically, some even make efforts to justify this move back 
into the Clouds. It is not therefore a case of a group of 
people doing one thing and saying another but that of moving 
towards two irreconcilable directions and seeking to justify 
both. 
Admittedly, there is no one subject matter to which 
all philosophers' hands are tied. Every approach, or indeed, 
every tradition of philosophy has its own merits and perhaps 
also its own relevance. That alone puts the matter on a 
place that makes complete nonsense of the question "which 
tradition is more relevant?" This may sound obscurantist, 
but it does point to an intrinsic characteristic of philosophical 
discourse, and indeed a rewarding one for the professional. 
For, if, as it suggests, the question of relevance remains 
a purely subjective matter then one man's opinion is as good 
as another's. But in the layman's thinking what is relevant 
and what is not are matters not of theory but of empirical 
assessment. And he, unlike the philosopher, would think 
that it is an issue that can be settled. The philosopher may 
intractably stick to his position but he is nevertheless 
constrained to take seriously the layman's view. To do 
otherwise is to ignore the same creed of relevance to which 
he is committed by social demand. 
This perhaps explains why most professional philosophers 
are very evasive about questions concerning the relevance 
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of their trade even when it is clear to them that they are 
unlikely to be left alone. For some of them the technique 
of avoiding such questions takes the form of expressive 
impatience, antagonizing enough to drive any inquirer into 
silence. Others, m01·e sincere to themselves perhaps, declare 
their ignorance, albeit with a blend of guilt and\ shame -
guilt for not knowing why they are paid for the job they 
perform, and shame for the lack of professional competence 
implied in their answer. Close to this category are those 
prepared at all costs to provide answers to issues they had 
not previously thought about. They put in the best their 
professional skills can afford, even when it calls for a 
redefinition of what philosophers do, often saying what 
philosophers ought to do rather than what they actually 
do. In the end what is achieved amounts to an intelligent 
expression of ignorance, but with a tag of insincerity which 
takes more than an ordinary mind to uncover. This, to say 
the least, is clear abuse of erudition. 
But while philosophers generally feel uneasy about 
matters of relevance they are never reticent on questions 
concerning the nature of their discipline. They are always 
prepared to discuss issues about what constitutes authentic 
philosophical discourse, what is to be regarded as a proper 
philosophy and what is not. The deep concern and enthusiasm 
with which African philosophers have, in recent years, taken 
up the issue of whether or not there is African philosophy 
give the uncomfortable impression that that question itself 
is what constitutes African philosophy. But this is by no 
means a preoccupation that is peculiar to African philosophers. 
It seems that by the nature of philosophy in general, there 
are more of its practitioners whose main concern is that 
of sifting the sheep from the flock, the fake from the 
authentic. They are often generous enough to brand some 
philosophies as merely "peripheral" and others as mere allied 
fields. If you were in such areas as Marxist philosophy, 
philosophical anthropology or say certain "philosophies of", 
you would readily receive the impression that your place 
was somewhere else and not among professional philosophers. 
You might even be faced with the embarrassing 1uestion 
of how philosophically relevant your area of interest is. 
There are undoubtedly professions which have protective 
devices, means whereby the doors are shut against 
non-members to avoid professional prostitutes whose practices 
pollute the ethics of the profession. The medical profession, 
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to take one instance, has every reason to do so. Some might 
argue that philosophers also do, and that there is need to 
separate "true" philosophers from "fake" ones, or put mildly, 
to identify the professionals from the non-professionals. 
There is what has now become an axiom in philosophy 
that seems indisputable among professionals, namely that 
the primary aim of philosophy is truth, not usefulness. This 
first principle had as its origin that initially unquestinable 
conception of philosophy as beginning with wonder. The 
philosopher was conceived as a man who wonders about 
the way things are, and how they became what they are. 
And in the process of doing this, the philosopher was supposed 
to arrive at the truth of such matters. It would be a mistake 
to think that this characteristic of philosophy has changed 
over the years. Still, it would be a greater error if it were 
thought that this process of reflection was devoid of 
usefulness. Philosophy, conceived as the search for truth, 
was not mutually exclusive with philosophy conceived in 
purely utilitarian terms. 
It appears as if there are philosophers whose concern 
is more with retaining the image of their professional call, 
protecting it against alternative conceptions, than answering 
the demands for redefinition which the realities of change 
in modern society dictate. This concern is understandable 
if we go by the principle of continuity. No discipline can 
sever ties with its past since it is the past that gives 
inspiration to the present, while the present is expected 
to serve as a stimulant for the future. But along this 
continuum, innovations come in. Obsolete ideas are dropped 
and new ones picked up. To that extent, a radical redefinition 
of philosopy both in content and method - where contiinity 
exists - sounds unrealistic. Indeed, the history of philosophy 
indicates clearly that efforts made by Kant, Hegel, Comte 
and Marx in the wake of modern science to retune the 
essentials of European philosophy were unsuccessful. 
The polemics between the brand of philosophy prefixed 
"speculative" and that which now goes in the name of "critical" 
or "analytic" philosophy has always been one of some assumed 
differences in goals rather than in approach. The speculative 
philosopher feels that his approach alone is practically 
motivated; that he does his job in order to answer the riddle 
of life; that his efforts are geared towards framing a vision 
of life with a view to liberating himself from pain and 
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suffering. In other words, the speculative philosopher thinks 
that what he does is determined by experience with the 
hope that the outcome will provide a guide for the future. 
All this, he thinks, the analytic philosopher sets aside for 
something else distant from human experience. 
It is true that the analytic philosopher has a less 
optimistic view about the potency of philosophy as a tool 
for directing human life. But it would be wrong to say that 
analytic philosophy itself is not practically motivated. In 
fact, most analytic philosophers believe strongly that their 
apparent preoccupation with matters of logic and language 
structure is closely tied to experience, which is in agreement 
with Socrates' dictum that the unexamined life is not worth 
living. It is doubtful if developments in science and technology 
would be what they are today without advancements in 
mathematics and logic which are products not necessarily 
of scientists themselves but of philosophical analysts. This 
way, no brand of philosophy may be said to be lacking in 
practical motivation even though the analyst may be more 
theoretically motivated. 
There is however another kind of general criticism 
which Western philosophers raise against themselves. Many 
of them feel that philosophy by its very nature is an 
unprogressive discipline. True, philosophers appear to continue 
to discuss with all seriousness, the same questions that were 
discussed in Greece thousands of years back. The point 
of criticism here is not only that these philosophers are 
repetitive, but also that they are reflecting not on their 
own experiences but on the experiences of people as 
historically distant as the ancient Greeks. 
Much as there is some weight in this argument, the 
modern European philosopher may immediately point out 
the continuity in European culture and experience, arguing 
strongly that the essential elements of the European past 
are indeed still operative in the modern era of European 
life. It is true that Europeans of today have learnt to fly 
jets or operate sophisticated machines. But that does not 
mean a break with their traditional heritage. Indeed, what 
we ref er to as the modern European way of life is a continued 
system from the very distant past with continuous 
modifications - a little removed and a little added - as 
generations of men come and go. There is therefore some 




Even when one admits a gap between the European 
past ·and present, and therefore sees the modern European 
philosopher as reflecting on the experiences of his ancestors 
rather than on his own experience, one realizes that in the 
case of the African philosopher his sin is that he is not 
reflecting on the past of his own culture for there is little 
or nothing handed down - at least not in written form -
for him to reflect upon. I do admit though that much work 
has been carried out by way of reflecting on the oral tradition 
of African cultures, at least since the dawn of literacy. 
But whether what is written has been properly done is an 
issue beyond my immediate concern here. It is perhaps 
safer to say that most of it is not philosophy. 
The continuity between the European past ~nd present 
is greatly reflected in the evolutionary world gro.wth theory, 
a view purported to be a historical account of world 
civilization in general, but which, in actual fact, is the history 
of Western civilization. As Ernest Gellner rightly observes, 
Western history has become "the history of humanity". 
But the important point of ref erring to Gellner here is more 
on the elements of continuity he builds into historical 
development than whether it is Western or World history. 
Western history seems to have a certain 
continuity and a certain persistent upward 
swing - or at any rate, so it seemed, and 
so it came to be taught. Emerging from 
the river valleys of the Middle East, the 
theory of civilization seems a one continous 
and, in the main, upward growth, only 
occasionally interrupted by plateaus and 
even retrogressions ..• Oriental empires, 
the Greeks, the Romans, Christianity, 
the Dark Ages, (a bit of a gap in the story), 
the high Middle Ages, the Renaissance, 
the Reformation, the new science, the 
Enlightenment, the French Revolution, 
industrialization and struggle for wider 
social justice ••• A picture of, on the whole, 
continuous and sustain~d and mainly 
indigenous upward growth, morally, 
intellectually, technologically is inescapable 
and gratifyingly suggested11.2 
Surely, there are defects in this kind of histor!cal 
evolutionism, but such weak links do not assail the elements 
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of continuity so greatly emphasized by the theory. Even 
Karl Popper, in his efforts to make as clear as possible the 
distinctive features of the "closed" society as opposed to 
the "open" one, took great pains to stress the continuity 
involved in the transition from the former to the latter. 
"Thus when we say that our Western civilization derives 
from the Greeks we ought to realize what it means. It means 
that the Greeks started for us that great revolution which, 
it seems, is still in its be~inning - the transition from the 
closed to the open society". 
True, Popper speaks of the breakdown of the "closed 
society" and the emergence of a new order marked by novel 
institutions and "thought that was free from magical 
obsessions", but he also assures us of how much of the old 
still lingers on: "our own ways of life are still beset with 
taboos, food taboos, taboos of politeness and many others". 4 
And, as if Popper suspected that this important point 
was likely to go unnoticed, he gives it greater emphasis 
again in his footnote. 
My characterization of the closed society 
as magical and of the open society as 
rational and critical of course makes 
it impossible to apply these terms without 
idealizing the society in question. The 
magical attitude has by no means 
disappeared from our life, not even in 
the most "open" societies so far realized 
and I think it unlikely that it can ever 
completely disappear. 5 
Popper made these remarks not too recently, and if 
Kwasi Wiredu writing in the 80s could assert confidence 
that "there are numbers of white men in London today who 
proudly proclaim themselves to be witches116 then the past 
of the European experience is not as gone as we .are made 
to believe. It may be too sweeping to conclude that the 
essential elements of the European experience are still 
accessible for a modern European to reflect on. What seems 
undeniable is that what we ref er to as "Modern European" 
thought is a blend of the past and the present. European 
historians hardly question Popper's statement that their 
'Western civilization originated with the Greeks', although 
they give the impres.9ion that the modern is so distinct from 
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the traditional. Surely, the plant would cease to be a plant 
if the roots were severed. 
It seems clear now why the questions that were discussed 
by the Greeks thousands of years back should be of serious 
interest to modern Europeans. The pioneering Greek thinkers 
have died but their thoughts and ideas have matured into 
what we now refer to as modern European philosophy. 
Now, let us return to the predicament of the modern 
African philosopher. Supposing an African student chooses 
to study Greek philosophy, surely he will find it intellectually 
rewarding. Indeed, very few people would question the merit 
of seeking to know about the past of very distant people 
such as the Greeks. It may turn out to be the case, perhaps 
by coincidence, that their experiences were in some ways 
similar to those of our African ancestors; which means that 
by studying their works we may learn about our past or 
anticipate an intellectual future similar to what now obtains 
in modern European culture. There is great utilitarian value 
in all this once we are prepared to accept, without any moral 
objection, the unilineal theory of evolution that somehow 
by no fault of ours the Greeks just happened to be 
intellectually ahead of us in the race. 
The Greeks were known to be men who cherished 
intellectual and moral excellence. Utility apart therefore, 
any modern academic wanting to know about the culture 
of such a people, how they lived and thought, even if such 
knowledge were considered an end in itself, would need 
to provide no further justification for his enterprise. It 
is true, after all, that the only way of learning to think is 
through a reconstruction of other people's thinking. And 
on a more general consideration, no knowledge can be said 
to be irrelevant. But that is not to say that some knowledge 
cannot be considered less worthwhile than others, which 
takes us direct to the crucial issue of what philosophical 
knowledge should be considered worth studying in, view of 
the special predicament of modern African society. 
However, before going into that let us raise another 
crucial but rather sensitive issue, that of what philosophical 
tradition the African is able to grapple with. The reason 
I regard this matter as sensitive is that it immedia-tely draws 
attention to the issue of the mental ability of races, 
reminiscent of the Jensen uproar of the late 60s and early 
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70s.7 What follows has nothing to do with either innate 
or acquired intellectual difference between one race or 
another. In other words, whatever I may describe as a 
deficiency or handicap is merely to be understood as a setback 
attributable more to lack of exposure than to some natural 
endownment. 
By speaking of the predicament of the African 
philosophers, I am drawing attention to certain kinds of 
deficiencies of the individual practitioner dictated by his 
experience rather than by features that characterize the 
group to which the individual belongs. It is a deficiency 
due to the mere absence of given prerequisites and not an 
inherited disability. For instance, my lack of exposure to 
classical music till adulthood immediately places me in 
a handicapped position were I tq attempt learning to read 
music. I may even become completely ineducable in that 
field. But that does not say anything about my intellectual 
endownment. It simply means that I never went along that 
path. I may even show higher intellectual competence in 
some area much more difficult than music. The average 
American student may show more competence in 
understanding the working mechanisms of a computer than 
the average Nigerian student. On the other hand, the Nigerian 
youth, particularly if he comes from the riverine areas, 
may show more competence in the understanding of the 
floating mechanisms of objects or about the complex behaviour 
of fishes, an area of knowledge in which his American 
counterpart may even be ineducable. Exposure and experience 
alone are the determining factors of ability in these varying 
fields. 
Put in very clear terms, the problem resides not with 
the nature of the subject-matter but with the student for 
whom experience has selected certain areas and for whom 
others have been excluded. Psychologists and educationists 
are better in putting this in the correct language. In summary, 
the point I am making amounts to this, as far as philosophizing 
in Africa is concerned the deficiencies of the African 
philosQpher do not amount to intellectual inadequacies. 
He is handicapped not as a matter of biological fact (i.e 
not by nature), but because his experience gives him one 
thing and he attempts to philosophize on another. 
Earlier in this paper I tried to point out the continuity 
between the European past and the present. The conclusion 
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from this continuity in experience is that since experience 
provides the raw material for philosophizing, the European 
philosopher is very much at home when reflecting either 
on the experiences of .his ancestors or on his own modern 
experience. Irrespective of temporal placement, the European 
does his reflection within a given culture and within a given 
experience. And this is what Mounce rneans by saying that 
"the savage differs from ourselves (i.e. Europeans) because 
he lives in a different form of society11.8 
Mounce's observations were made in relation to a very 
familiar problem raised by Peter Winch.9 There is a 
fundamental difficulty, according to Winch, in seeking to 
understand an alien culture using the paradigm of "our own" 
culture. This is a problem sociologists and social 
anthropologists realized, even before Winch. . But they had 
hoped that it could be solved through the intensification 
of field research and participation - what they regarded 
as the process of moving from the outside to the inside. 
This view is also accepted by many African intellectuals 
in the same fields. For them, the errors committed, so 
far, in what has been written in the area of African thought; 
are by outsiders who fail to realize that it takes more than 
a few years of field research to enter fully into a foreign 
culture and understand it thoroughly. The persuasive argument 
for this position is that the foreign investigator needs to 
share fully in the experience of the subject matter of 
investigation. He needs to be part of the culture he wants 
to analyse by understanding its symbolic expressions, language 
and history. 
Although the above point against foreign investigators 
is usually made in relation to the general study of cultures, 
it also applies firmly in the case of philosophy. Turning 
the barrel of the gun against ourselves, one may now ask 
if the African philosopher is in a position to adequately 
analyse alien thought without the prerequisite experience 
that determines such thought, and with the paradigm of 
his own thought system. 
Now, take the typical African student seeking to 
understand the reflections of Plato, Kant, Berkeley, Russell, 
etc. Psychologically, the subject matter stands as distant 
from him as the personalities themselves. The subject matter, 
for psychological reason, might seem more real and perhaps 
nearer home if instead of Berkeley or Kant it was credited 
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to, say, Wiredu, Sodipo or Bodunrin who are notable African 
philosophers. The African philosophers may regard these 
European thinkers as "founding fathers". However, because 
the African blood does not flow from the Europeans, their 
works are bound to be received as ideas devoid of the 
accompanying experiences. One may even take the more 
daring route, for example, of learning the German Language 
in order to understand Kant without realizing that 
understanding the German language is a far cry from sharing 
the German experience. The problem that any other non-
German - speaking student interested in Kant would face 
a similar difficulty does not arise because such a student 
could share the German experience by historical affinity 
without necessarily being German-speaking. 
The main point of this example is that the African 
philosopher interested in the study of Kant finds difficulties 
in understanding him not because of some genetic deficiency, 
but because the logic of Kant's reasoning is more intellectually 
accessible in the full context of certain aspects of the culture 
out of which his ideas originated. This does not mean that 
only African philosophers find Kant difficult to understand; 
it simply means that they require additional efforts to do 
so. 
There are quite a number of factors in traditional 
philosophical practice which by their very nature tend to 
alienate the African professional philosopher from the 
mainstream of philosophy. I refer here to those who claim 
to be more 'philosophical' among African philosophers; those 
to whom, for example, symbolic logic, epistemology, 
metaphysics and indeed pure analytic philosophy . of the 
Western type is the philosophy. Admittedly, this attitude 
is inherited from Western philosophers some of whom feel 
that not an those who profess to be philosophers are genuine 
philosophers. Unfortunately, the rate at which the attitude 
is dying out in the West is the same rate at which African 
philosophers are picking it up. 
Quite a lot of intellectually stimulating arguments 
exist in the so-called core areas of philosophy. Exposure 
to such arguments serves the function of initiating the 
beginner. Repeatedly rehearsed, such arguments tend to 
be less stimulating. Thus the philosophy teacher sounds 
almost like the comedian who entertains his audience 
repeatedly with the same jokes. But, perhaps, it might be 
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argued that the comedian, like the philosopher, can continue 
to be in the market as long as his audience changes from 
show to show. What this means in the case of the philosophy 
teacher is that what he teaches will always stimulate his 
students only if they are always new students. This may 
be all there is to the business of teaching and learning a.t 
certain levels, but it is surely not a position of comfort 
for any professional philosopher to find himself in. 
Apart from the issue of transmitting stale ideas from 
one generation to another, there are some dedicated 
philosophers and philosophy teachers who see danger in passing 
down certain types of philosophical ideas to beginners. 
Peter Geach for example, in his 'On Teaching Logic1,lO 
observes that there is a lot of "bad logic·", that is formal 
logic, being taught to students. According to him, "Thousands 
of young people are infected with bad logical habits which 
may be harder to cure, and more productive of long-term 
evils, than physical diseases11.ll Geach's point goes further 
than the unproductive nature of formal logic. It is sterile, 
he points out, but its greatest damage to whoever takes 
it in is that it serves as a mental block. The point Geach 
stresses is that unlike other philosophical discussions in 
which the teacher and his student may disagree, each 
advancing his own reasons in support of a position, there 
is the master/apprentice relationship in formal logic. The 
rules have been laid down and all that is required is the 
ability to manipulate within the accepted rules. What seems 
obvious from this is that there is bad as well as good 
philosophy. Within the African context, works so far produced 
fall into the same categories and it is easy to point out the 
factors responsible. 
As I said earlier, most contemporary African philosophers 
are Western trained. However, they fall into different 
categories. There are those who, although African by race, 
have spent a greater part of their lives in Western cultures. 
To some extent such African philosophers could be said 
to have partaken of the Western experience to the extent 
that the intellectual culture in which they were nurtured 
and educated is as familiar to them as it is to the indigenous 
people. They share the same language, mode of reasoning 
and, apart from minor differences, they are the same in 
intellectual orientation. There is yet another category of 
African philosophers who are African by race and )lave lived 
a greater part of their life in Africa. This category is. 
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therefore predominantly African in intellectual orientation 
but with a little dose of Western education - this is the group 
of African philosophers that can be said to be caught between 
two intellectual cultures. 
The first group of African philosophers with a full Western 
intellectual orientation are also very skillful in the techniques 
of philosophical analysis. But their dilemma is how to apply 
their acquired skills in answer to the new creed of relevance. 
There are two ways in which philosophers in this category 
have sought to make contributions. The first is a devotion 
to talking about the nature of African philosophy itself, 
what constitutes an African philosophy and whether or not 
such a philosophy exists. Kwasi Wiredu, Odera Oruka, Paulin 
Hountondji, Peter Bodunrin and a host of others have dwelt 
on thls matter for years before they started to realize its 
futility .12 
In the attempt to make some positive contribution to 
African philosophy, some of these philosophers have adopted 
an orientation intended to "assimilate 'the advances of analytic 
philosophy and apply them to the general social and 
intellectual changes in Africa".13 I have criticized this 
orientation in African philosophy elsewhere.14 Briefly, 
the points of my arguments are as follows: First, the process 
of "domesticating" Western philosophy amounts to a mere 
reformulation of known philosophical problems without 
actually attempting to solve them. Second, the orientation 
in most cases, such as in Wiredu's 'The Concept of Truth 
in the Akan Language115 and 'The Akan Concept of MinQ',16 
amounts to no more than a process of linguistic translation 
in which age-long philosophical problems are recouched 
in African languages. Indeed, Wiredu's title of 'Formulating 
Modern Thought in African Languagesil 7 betrays this point. 
And third, the process of "assimilating" from Western 
philosophy to African thought is likely to result in as many 
African philosophies as there are African languages. 
This orientation in African philosophy rests on the belief 
that modern African philosophy can only be built on "the 
written traditions of other lands". And it is greately 
influenced by these scholars' interactions with the 
philosophical traditions of the West. True, if ~ou presented 
a philosophical argument to a group of African students 
and you failed to reveal your source, the originator of the 
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idea, when and where it was written, you might have to 
find some other ways of injecting seriousness into your 
teaching. Or if you presented a conference paper on the 
Mind-Body problem, and you omitted mention of Plato's 
metaphysics through Descartes to Austin and Ryle, then 
you have not spoken in the language of your audience. This 
is the dilemma those in this orientation are seeking to 
overcome. 
Now, the other orientation in African philosophy is 
di:ctated more by ideological commitment than by some 
professional requirements. This is the approach adopted 
by the second category of philosophy teachers whose cultural 
outlook is still basically African. In most cases, this 
orientation is in response to the creed of relevance and 
the impression that any philosophit:al discussion not tied 
to the African scene has no practical relevance. The 
character of works of this orientation is almost wholly 
descriptive and one example will suffice as an illustration. 
In 'African Philosophy and Existence' c.s. Momoh unfolds 
what his community believes to be the attributes of animals: 
Animals are as rational and as wise as 
men ••• the concept of obedience is not 
foreign to animals ••• animals recognize 
danger and have techniques of avoidance 
••• they even know what honour and dignity 
mean ••• animals do not get into deep 
w~ters because they know they will be 
drowned.ls 
All this was written and presented as a paper on 'African 
Philosophy' to a group of philosophers. One now begins to 
see the sense in which the term 'African' has become a prefix 
for marketing anything. It is quite alright if the above 
information were being given to a foreign visitor totally 
unacquainted with the culture concerned or if it were simply 
a fable told to children. Unfortunately, so much of this 
kind of stuff is paraded as African philosophy in African 
institutions of higher learning. It is doubly unfortunate 
th~~ students are more receptive to this descriptive sort 
of discussion than to more rige>rous philosophical analysis. 
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The p9int is not that the quotation above does not attract 
some philosophical questions. It does, but the ability to 
unveil such questions depends on the creative skill of the 
teacher or student. One thing for sure, no matter how 
incoherent the beliefs in question may appear, the importance 
of reckoning with them simply lies in the fact that they 
govern the lives of a people. If, for instance, the reported 
information is true, that is, that the community holds the 
belief that "animals are as rational and as wise as men" 
one may ask the follpwing questions: Could there have been 
any discrepancy .between the belief as it is entertained by 
members of the community and the form in which it is 
reported? Is the reported belief couched in the idiom in 
which it is held within the community? When members 
of the community say they 'believe', is this intended to mean 
that they also 'know'? What would such a community regard 
as the distinctive features that distinguish men from animals? 
What could they possibly mean by 'rational' and 'wise' assuming 
that these terms have been adequately translated? 
Now, such questions inject a great amount of philosophical 
character into the belief systems in question. The beliefs 
themselves or their descriptive accounts do not meet the 
basic requirements of philosophical discourse. Yet it is 
an orientation based on the raw materials of the African 
experience with which the student and the teacher share 
an affinity. This is what I find absent in the orientation 
aimed at "domesticating" Western philosophy. 
It should now be obvious how the orientation I am 
proposing is implicit in any of the above questions. In an 
attempt to answer the questions, the philosophy that evolves 
will be uniquely African not only in content but also in 
m,ethodology. I must, however, grant that in systematizing 
such a body of knowledge, the need may arise to draw on 
parallel arguments in Western philosophy. For instance, 
I have had the occasion of referring to J.R. Smythies' Science 
and Espl9 in my course on African philosophy, not because 
I was not sure of my analysis of the philosophical problems 
posed by the phenomena of magic, witchcraft or oracles. 
Rather it was because I felt that the similarities drawn 
up by Huxley's article in the book between these phenomena 
and ESP would enrich the students' understanding of the 
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problem. Doing this is as distant from domesticating alien 
ideas as it is from providing a mere descriptive account. 
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